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Railways were one of the main engines of the Latin American trade boom before 
1914. Railway construction often required financial support from local 
governments, which depended on their fiscal capacity. But since the main 
government revenues were trade-related, this generated a two-way feedback 
between government revenues and railways, with a potential for multiple 
equilibria. The empirical tests in this paper support the hypothesis of such a 
positive two-way relationship. The main implication of our analysis is that the 
build-up of state capacity was a necessary condition for railway expansion and 
also, to a large extent, for export expansion in Latin America during the first 
globalisation. 
 
 
One of the main challenges faced by developing countries derives from the need to 
secure an adequate level of infrastructure.2
Within those countries’ transport systems, railways played a prominent role, as the 
cheapest available means for the inland conveyance of freight. Due to the shortage of 
 While large infrastructure investment may 
be insufficient to stimulate an economy if other fundamental growth determinants are 
lacking, income growth can be substantially depressed by inadequate or insufficient 
infrastructure. Such was indeed the case in Latin America during the first globalisation 
period. In the export-led growth process that preceded the First World War, the ability 
of most Latin American economies to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by 
the integration in world markets largely depended on the availability of transportation 
facilities to channel commodities to the international economy. 
                                                          
1 We are grateful to Andrés Álvarez, Leticia Arroyo-Abad, Andrea Bassanini, Dan Bogart, Theresa 
Gutberlet, Silvana Harriet, Nuno Palma, José A. Peres-Cajías, Florian Ploeckl, María Teresa Ramírez, 
Jaime Reis, Fabbio Sanches, Richard Sicotte, Bill Summerhill, and participants at the ALL-UC Group 
Conference on Transport, Institutions, and Economic Performance: Historical Perspectives (UC-Irvine, 
December 2011), the XVI World Economic History Congress (Stellenbosch, July 2012), the seminar of 
the Colombian Economic History Association at Los Andes University in Bogotá (October 2012), the 
APHES conference in Lisbon (November 2012), the EHS conference in York (April 2013) and the World 
Business History Congress (Frankfurt, March 2014). We also thank Juan H. Flores and Béatrice Dedinger 
for sharing unpublished data with us. None of them are responsible for the mistakes of the text. The views 
expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Banque de France or the Eurosystem. 
2 See, e.g., Estache, ‘Infrastructure and development’; Straub, ‘Infrastructure and growth’. 
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alternative infrastructure and the scarcity of navigable routes, in many countries 
railways became essential for the exploitation and export of a large share of the natural 
resources that constituted those economies’ comparative advantage. Whereas railways 
could not generate economic development in the absence of other fundamental factors, 
their shortage could significantly constrain export expansion and income growth. This 
explains why some of the available estimates of the economic impact of railways in 
Latin America are very high in comparative terms.3
Despite its potentially high growth impact, railway investment did not spread evenly 
throughout the region. In many Latin American countries the development of rail 
transport was sluggish and the final network mileage was disappointingly low, which 
may have prevented those economies from taking full advantage of the opportunities 
opened by the first globalisation. There are several potential explanations for this failure 
to build dense railway networks in certain countries, such as ruggedness or institutional 
instability. But, as is usual with infrastructure investment in developing countries,
 
4
The dependence of Latin American railway expansion on government resources can 
be rationalized in the context of the ‘big push’ models, in which government 
intervention was required to overcome coordination failures and bring an economy from 
a low to a high-level equilibrium.
 
differences in the intensity of railway construction among countries also seem to have 
depended on each government’s financial capacity to subsidize construction or to 
guarantee a certain level of profits to private investors. 
5 However, it is also consistent with a ‘big grab’ 
explanation, in which government and investors’ money was necessary not only to build 
railways with high positive externalities, but also to pay for greasing the wheels of 
politics, and/or to channel rents to railway promoters. And, finally, it could also stem 
from the redistributive effects of infrastructure, which could generate resistance and the 
need to compensate losers in exchange for their approval.6
                                                          
3 Coatsworth, ‘Indispensable railroads’; Summerhill, Order against progress; Herranz-Loncán, 
‘Transport technology’. 
 These explanations may 
jointly help to understand why, despite their high potential social returns, the majority 
of the railways that were built in Latin America required government support.  
4 Eichengreen, ‘Financing infrastructure’. 
5 Rosenstein-Rodan, ‘Problems of industrialisation’; Murphy et al., ‘Industrialization and the big push’; 
Bjorvatn and Coniglio, ‘Big push or big failures’. 
6 Redistribution of rents to ensure cooperation is actually a feature of politics in countries with limited 
access order; see North et al., Violence and social orders. 
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The dependence of railway investment on government resources, however, posed a 
complex puzzle in a period in which most revenues of Latin American governments 
derived from trade taxes. Such fiscal structure implied that government resources were 
limited in each country by the degree of trade expansion. But this, in turn, as has been 
indicated, might have been hindered in some economies by an insufficient endowment 
of transportation infrastructure and the scarcity of railway routes. This could have 
created a double feedback relation wherein railway construction was limited by the size 
of government revenues, and these could only grow with the expansion of foreign trade, 
but trade development was only possible through the enlargement of the railway 
network. This mutual causation relationship would be consistent with the existence of 
multiple equilibria and the possibility of some countries being caught in a non-
development trap of low foreign trade and low railway construction.  
The objective of this paper is to test the existence of such bidirectional causality 
between government revenues and railway development. To that end we estimate a two 
equation model of government revenues and railway expansion in Latin America 
between 1865 and 1913 and find supportive evidence of a positive two-way relationship 
between the two variables, which is robust to several specifications. 
We do not explore here the specific reasons (such as geography, institutions, or bad 
luck in the ‘commodity lottery’, among others) that explain why some countries fell into 
a low development trap under those circumstances. Instead, in this paper, rather than 
exploring the particular ultimate factors that explain each country’s evolution, we 
suggest some clues about one of the channels through which those factors affected the 
Latin American economies during the period. Our results indicate that countries with 
unfavourable circumstances not only found difficulties to export, but were also unable, 
due to the impossibility to increase their government revenues, to build the 
infrastructure that would have allowed them to remove their external constraints. In 
addition, over and above each country’s initial (dis)advantages, our results also indicate 
that exogenous short-term shocks to state revenues had long-term effects on railway 
expansion and, therefore, on export growth. Our analysis may contribute in this way to a 
better understanding of the different ability of Latin American economies to reap the 
potential gains from globalisation before 1914.  
 
I 
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During the first globalisation, railways were a key factor for trade growth in Latin 
America. Due to the scarcity of alternative infrastructure and the limited reach of the 
available water routes in most of the region, domestic transport costs before the 
railways were too high to allow a sustained and rapid growth of exports, except in areas 
with good access to waterways or for commodities with very high value-to-weight 
ratios, such as gold or silver. 
With a few exceptions, Latin American economies’ interior areas had to rely on 
overland transport for trade. Only a few feasible navigable routes were available, such 
as the Amazonas in Brazil, the Magdalena in Colombia or the River Plate system in 
Uruguay and North-East Argentina, and even there conditions for navigation were not 
always favourable.7 In addition, Latin American pre-railway overland transportation 
was very precarious. Most roads were not accessible for carts, and a large share of 
freight transport depended exclusively on pack animals.8 The primitive character of 
Latin American road transport can be illustrated by the ratio between the average unit 
price of pre-railway (largely road) freight transport and the average rates of railway 
freight, which reached levels of 7 to 13 in Argentina, Brazil or Mexico in the early 20th 
century. By comparison, a few decades earlier that ratio had ranged from 2.6 to 3.3 in 
England and Wales, France or the US.9
Under these circumstances, in many countries railways became essential for the 
exploitation of natural resources in inland areas, and crucial for export expansion to 
achieve its full growth potential. A preliminary illustration of the correlation between 
railway development and export growth is provided in Figure 1, which shows that those 
countries that reached higher levels of exports per capita in 1913 also invested more 
resources per capita in railways. This correlation is consistent with the fact that Latin 
American railways were mainly specialized in freight. By 1910-14, and in contrast with 
 
                                                          
7 For instance, traffic through the Magdalena River was slow and highly dependent on weather 
conditions, and the route was only partially navigable; see Ramírez, ‘Los ferrocarriles’ or Safford, ‘El 
problema de los transportes’.  
8 On pre-railway transport infrastructure in Spanish America see Gutiérrez Álvarez, Las comunicaciones, 
as well as Summerhill, Order against progress, for Brazil, Clark, ‘Railway building’, for Ecuador, 
Coatsworth, Growth against development, for México, or Zegarra, ‘Transport costs and economic 
growth’ for Peru. In some cases, such as Mexico, the transport system experienced an involution between 
the end of the colonial period and the 1870s, with a decrease in wheeled traffic and an increase in the use 
of pack animals; see Riguzzi, ‘Los caminos del atraso’. 
9 Figures calculated from Herranz-Loncán, ‘Transport technology’; Fishlow, American railroads; Hawke, 
Railways and economic growth; and Caron, ‘France’. The comparison reported in the text is biased by the 
fact that figures for England and Wales, France or the US are calculated for the 1860s and 1870s, and 
railway transport unit costs tended to decrease over time. However, productivity gains in the western 
countries’ railway systems between 1860 and 1914 were far too low to bring these ratios to levels similar 
to the Latin American ones by 1914 (see, e.g., Crafts et al., ‘Total factor productivity growth’). 
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the situation in most industrialized economies, freight revenues were between 2 and 4 
times as large as passenger revenues in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and 
Uruguay,10 and a large share of railway freight in those countries consisted of exports.11 
More specifically, railways were indispensable for the growth of several export sectors, 
such as saltpetre in Chile, coffee in Brazil, sugar in Cuba, silver and tin in Bolivia, or 
coffee, bananas and animal skins in Costa Rica.12 Conversely, the lack of railways has 
been identified as one of the main reasons for the sluggish growth of Colombian coffee 
exports, or Peruvian exports in general.13
Figure 1 here 
 
 
Despite the positive impact of rail transport on export growth, many countries failed to 
build an extensive railway system. The first railway line in the region was opened in 
Cuba in 1837, only 12 years after the inauguration of the first British steam-driven 
public railway, but Cuba would not be joined by any other Latin American economy 
before the 1850s. Only then did railway construction start in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru, gradually spreading thereafter to the rest of the 
region. By 1900, all Latin American countries had some railways in operation, but the 
length of the national networks was very uneven. Railway construction had been very 
intense in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which accounted for approximately 75 per cent 
of the whole Latin American mileage by the late 1880s. When measured in relative 
terms, investment in railway infrastructure had also been remarkable in Chile, Uruguay, 
Cuba and Costa Rica, both in per capita terms and in relation to the national surface 
area, as may be seen in Table 1. Other countries, by contrast, clearly lagged behind this 
group. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Table 1 may be taken as preliminary evidence of the different role that railways 
performed in each Latin American economy before 1914. Whereas some countries 
                                                          
10 See Coatsworth, Growth against development; Zegarra, ‘Transportation costs and the social savings’; 
Summerhill, Order against progress; Quesada Monge, ‘Ferrocarriles y crecimiento’; and Herranz-
Loncán, ‘El impacto directo’ and ‘The role of railways’. 
11 See, e.g., Coatsworth, Growth against development; Zegarra, ‘Transportation costs and the social 
savings’. However, in the case of Mexico Kuntz Ficker, ‘Mercado interno’ has also stressed the 
importance of domestic-oriented traffic within total railway freight. 
12 Thomson and Angerstein, Historia del ferrocarril; Summerhill, Order against progress; Zanetti 
Lecuona and García Álvarez, Caminos para el azúcar; Mitre, Los patriarcas and Bajo un cielo de estaño; 
Quesada Monge, ‘Ferrocarriles y crecimiento’. 
13 Ocampo, ‘El sector externo’; Zegarra, ‘Transport costs and economic growth’. 
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could benefit from relatively dense networks, in other cases the expansion of the new 
infrastructure was extremely slow and, by 1914, railway systems consisted just of a few 
isolated lines that connected particular production areas with the main ports, while 
hardly affecting large swathes of the territory. The social savings literature has 
confirmed that those Latin American countries that built extensive railway networks 
before 1914 obtained huge direct benefits from railway transport. Among those 
economies, social savings were only low in Uruguay, a country with some exceptional 
natural transport advantages which made railways less indispensable.14 In Argentina, 
Mexico and Brazil, where cheap transportation alternatives were not as abundant, 
railways provided social savings amounting on average to ca. one quarter of GDP by 
1910-13. By contrast, in Peru and Colombia, two countries in which railway 
development remained disappointingly slow, the estimates of the social savings of 
railway freight for 1918 and 1927, respectively, range from 2 to 8 per cent of GDP.15
Given the high potential economic impact of railways in Latin America, analysing 
why railway development differed markedly across countries before 1914 may 
contribute to a better understanding of the reasons for the region’s internal divergence. 
This requires an examination of the railway investors’ decision making process. In Latin 
America, railway capital and entrepreneurial initiative came from three different 
origins: governments, domestic capitalists and foreign firms. The first two sources were 
relatively important at the beginning of the period, but gradually lost prominence. 
Already by 1899 governments owned just 16 per cent, and domestic capital 13 per cent 
of the total Latin American railway mileage, and those percentages had decreased even 
further by 1913.
 
16
                                                          
14 Herranz-Loncán, ‘The role of railways’. 
 
15 For Argentina, Herranz-Loncán, ‘El impacto directo’; for Mexico, Coatsworth, ‘Indispensable 
railroads’; for Brazil, Summerhill, Order against progress; for Colombia, Ramírez, ‘Los ferrocarriles’; 
and, for Peru, Zegarra, ‘Transportation costs and the social savings’. 
16 Public capital was especially important in some Central American economies and in Chile, although its 
presence was also noticeable in Colombia, Brazil and Argentina. In some economies (especially in 
Central America), state railways were largely financed by issuing external sovereign debt, which was 
used as a substitute for the lacking foreign direct investment. By contrast, in Argentina and Chile public 
investment was, to some extent, complementary to private undertakings, often financing lines that ran 
through poor and distant regions, as an instrument of political integration with very low profitability 
prospects. Domestic private capital was especially prevalent in Cuba (where it owned 40% of the network 
in 1899, but had controlled almost 100% until the 1880s), Puerto Rico, Brazil and Venezuela (with 
percentages of 20 to 30% in 1899), and also, to a certain extent, in Chile, and was highly connected with 
certain export activities, such as Cuban sugar, Brazilian coffee, or Chilean copper mining (Sanz 
Fernández, Historia de los ferrocarriles; on the role of domestic capital see also Lewis, ‘The financing of 
railway development’, pp. 257-60).  
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By far, the largest share of Latin American railway capital came from foreign 
investment, which entered the region mainly in the form of new construction initiatives, 
but also by taking over publicly-owned and domestic private firms.17 The relevance of 
foreign capital increased since the 1880s, especially after the Baring crisis led to the 
failure of several local initiatives, and foreign enterprises ended up controlling almost 
75 per cent of the railway mileage in 1899, and an even higher percentage (80 to 90 per 
cent) in the years immediately before 1914. Among foreign investors, capital raised in 
London was absolutely dominant during the late nineteenth century, accounting for 70 
per cent of the mileage under foreign operation in 1899. However, since 1900 the 
importance of US capital grew rapidly, being especially relevant in the US area of 
influence i.e. Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America.18
Since the majority of Latin American railway investment was financed by foreign 
capital, those factors that made some destinations more attractive than others to foreign 
investors may account for cross-country differences in railway development. Beyond 
each country’s geographical characteristics (e.g. ruggedness), Latin American railway 
historians have associated foreign investment and railway construction dynamism with 
three main factors: i) the degree of institutional stability; ii) governments’ financial 
capacity to subsidize the railway system; and iii) the growth of exports of one or several 
products of increasing world demand.
 
19
Government involvement was also crucial for railway development to take off, either 
through subsidies to private investment and different types of public-private partnership, 
or through direct public construction. Railway subsidies took different forms, such as 
interest guarantees (often at 7 per cent of invested capital), or a fixed construction 
subsidy per mile (as in Mexico and Honduras, for instance), and constituted a large 
 The first of these three factors may explain 
why, in most countries, significant construction only started in the late 1860s or early 
1870s, once post-independence political turmoil had sufficiently abated. The two 
exceptions were Cuba and Chile, which were among the most institutionally stable 
countries after independence. Cuba, which remained linked to the Spanish Empire until 
1898, was one of the first countries in the world to build railways, and in Chile 
construction was very active since the early 1850s.  
                                                          
17 Privatization of public lines was very important in some countries, such as Peru, where foreign capital 
bought a large percentage of public railways in 1890, and Argentina and Mexico in the closing years of 
the 19th century. 
18 Sanz Fernández, Historia de los ferrocarriles. 
19 See ibid., in the different country studies included in the book. 
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burden on many Latin American budgets.20 Examples of the direct link between well 
funded public support and the start of railway construction are abundant. In Chile, for 
instance, the completion of the Santiago-Valparaíso line in the 1850s was only achieved 
after the government entered the shareholder capital.21 Similarly, no construction took 
place in Brazil until the government started supporting it in 1852 and, in Argentina and 
Uruguay, provincial or central governments’ financial support was granted since the 
arrival of the first railways.22 The expansion of the Peruvian railway network between 
the 1850s and the 1870s was also allowed for by the abundance of fiscal revenues.23
In contrast, the lack of central governments’ resources is one of the factors that 
explain the delay in railway construction in Mexico before the Porfiriato or in 
Colombia until the 1880s, whereas the elimination of subsidies in Venezuela in 1892 
was behind the sudden interruption in railway construction in this country.
 
24 The main 
exception to this dependence of railway construction on government resources was 
Cuba, where the early railways were built without government support, on the basis of 
the sugar boom. Construction of railways in Cuba, however, stagnated in the 1860s and 
only accelerated again after independence, when subsidies were granted to new lines.25
The need for government intervention was not exclusive of the railways. Many large 
investment projects in Latin America during this period also required government 
involvement or some kind of public-private partnership.
 
With this exception, railways constructed without government support were usually 
cheaply built lines, which often connected the short distance between a firm’s plant 
(which sometimes owned the lines) and the main port or a trunk railway line (such as 
the early mining railways in Northern Chile).  
26
                                                          
20 For instance, in Argentina the guarantees amounted to more than 4.5 million pesos by 1890, whereas 
the total budget of the nation was 33.6 million pesos; see López, Historia de los ferrocarriles; and in 
Mexico railway subsidies were one of the main factors behind the fiscal crisis of 1884-85 (Riguzzi, ‘Los 
caminos del atraso’). 
 Government involvement in 
those cases varied from direct public construction and management (especially in roads 
and ports), or subcontracting the construction to a foreign firm (as in the Mexican case 
with Pearson), to granting the foreign firm a monopoly, usually in very generous 
21 Thomson and Angerstein, Historia del ferrocarril. 
22 Summerhill, Order against progress; Gómez, ‘El incierto lugar’; Lewis, British railways. 
23 Zegarra, ‘Transport costs and economic growth’. 
24 Riguzzi, ‘Los caminos del atraso’; Safford, ‘El problema de los transportes’; Sanz Fernández, Historia 
de los ferrocarriles. 
25 Zanetti Lecuona and García Álvarez, Caminos para el azúcar. 
26 British investment in Latin American public utilities (specially, urban transport) increased continuously 
since 1865, and reached very high levels (up to one third of total British investment flows in Latin 
American railways) by 1913 (Stone, ‘British long-term investment’, p. 323). 
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conditions.27 Subsidising schemes, similar to those used in the railways, although not 
very frequent, could also be found in some undertakings.28
There are several potential explanations as to why government resources were so 
crucial for the expansion of railway infrastructure. The most obvious is the presence of 
market failures and the need of government intervention to coordinate private 
investment, in line with the ‘Big Push’ hypothesis. Given the high fixed costs, 
indivisible capital and the long time that had to pass until full potential traffic and 
profits were reached, investors required some guarantee of return, in order to 
compensate for the perceived uncertainty as to whether export activities would take off 
and make the railway investment profitable.
 
29
Moreover, in some economies, and especially in the smaller ones, the market power 
of railway promoters may have increased the need for government resources. According 
to Bulmer-Thomas: 
 This uncertainty could have several 
origins, such as the incomplete settlement and the open frontier of some countries, the 
volatility of the terms of trade, or the perceived risk of unrest, violence, political 
instability and sovereign default.  
In the smaller republics the resources at the disposal of foreign companies created 
an unequal relationship with the governments of the countries themselves, and many 
contracts were signed that –with the benefit of hindsight- look excessively generous 
to the foreign companies. This was also true in some of the larger countries, such as 
Peru, where the weak fiscal position gave the government little room to maneuver.30
Similarly, as stressed by Lewis for the case of São Paulo, the promoters’ position was 
reinforced by the authorities’ ‘need to preserve their financial credibility, which made 
them easy victims of less scrupulous railway promoters’, as well as by their lack of 
experience and the absence of financial or technical criteria to assess concessions and 
subsidies, especially at the beginning of the period.
 
31
                                                          
27 Connolly, El contratista de Don Porfirio; Bulmer-Thomas, The economic History. 
 Finally, corruption and the 
promoters’ connections with local governments often helped to secure generous 
concessions and public subsidies. These problems were more serious in small countries, 
28 Stone, ‘British long-term investment’. 
29 Summerhill, Order against progress; Lewis, British railways.  
30 Bulmer-Thomas, The economic History, pp. 106-7. 
31 Lewis, British railways, p. 11; see also Connolly, El contratista de Don Porfirio. 
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where railway promoters acquired almost limitless power to decide on many aspects of 
the economy, as happened in the case of Costa Rica with Keith and his collaborators.32
Finally, the dependence of railway construction on government resources was also 
associated to its redistribution effects, which could affect the political decision to 
implement or not certain infrastructure projects. Railway construction involved 
significant changes in the price of the surrounding land and in the degree of integration 
of labour and goods markets, which redistributed income between regions and 
industries, and destroyed local rents through increased competition. Because those 
redistributive consequences could fuel resistance, railway development required 
political skills and resources to negotiate the agreement of all parties potentially affected 
by the route of each line. In other words, governments needed to buy off the approval of 
local elites to railway projects. Sometimes, this also required investing public money 
(through subsidies) in some unprofitable railways. For instance, in the case of the 
Brazilian state of São Paulo, Lewis suggests that 
  
... it would be facile to argue that unprofitable railway building was simply a 
function of a weak state apparatus unable to arbitrate between the competing claims 
of different groups. Peculiar circumstances apart ..., paulistas recognised that only 
in the new coffee zone were railways likely to prove financially viable ... However, 
there were pressing reasons why the province aspired to a more extensive network 
and why landowners were anxious to socialise construction costs, shifting to the 
Treasury the burden of unprofitable construction.33
The lack of resources to compensate losers or pay for the assent of local elites provoked 
the failure of some projects, as in Colombia, where the plans of the government in 1871 
to give priority to the Ferrocarril del Norte, which would favour the states of 
Cundinamarca, Bocayá and Santander at the expense of the West and the Caribbean, 
generated resentment and were one of the reasons of the civil war of 1876.
 
34
The use of railway construction for redistributive purposes, or the promoters’ 
exercise of their market power (not to mention corruption) might well have been 
responsible for an excessive investment in lines with low profitability prospects. 
Nevertheless, these problems are intrinsic to government intervention in infrastructure 
investment, together with the construction of lines for political, military or 
 
                                                          
32 Quesada Monge, ‘Ferrocarriles y crecimiento’. 
33 Lewis, ‘Public policy’, p. 19. 
34 Safford, ‘El problema de los transportes’; Bogart, ‘Did the Glorious Revolution’, describes a similar 
case of elites’ blocking of infrastructure construction in seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain. 
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administrative reasons, and were widespread worldwide in railway construction in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.35
 As a consequence of the negative effects of government involvement, the aggregate 
social rates of return of Latin American railways were probably lower than in a 
counterfactual situation with perfect information and no distortions. However, given the 
high social benefits estimated for railways in certain countries, the negative effects of 
state intervention were most likely offset by its positive effects on the improvement in 
the transport system. In the case of Brazil, for instance, ‘guaranteed dividend policy 
attracted investments in railways that the country had failed to obtain previously’ and, 
in those investment, the social rates of return (ranging from 11 to 28 per cent per year) 
were far higher than the private ones. It is true that the private benefits in the most 
profitable Brazilian railways were higher than the market rates of return and that, with 
perfect information, the subsidy might have been avoided. However, the cost of this 
policy mistake seems to have been small (compared with the social benefits provided by 
those railways) and, given the underlying degree of uncertainty, there was no guarantee 
that capital would have been forthcoming to those profitable undertakings in the 
absence of subsidies.
 
36
Together with institutional stability and government support, the third explanatory 
factor for differences in railway development among Latin American countries was 
export growth. External trade dynamism, however, was not only important as an 
indicator of potential profits for foreign investors, but also the main source of 
government revenues. The lion share of government resources came either from the 
taxation of natural resource extraction or, more commonly, from custom tariffs. 
According to Bulmer-Thomas: 
 
... governments throughout the region relied heavily on import tariffs to generate 
public revenue. … Tax reform brought about the elimination of many taxes inherited 
from colonial times and a concentration on external trade taxes; by the time of the 
First World War no country received less than 50 percent of public revenue from 
custom duties, and in many cases the share was more than 70 percent.37
                                                          
35 See, e.g., Millward, ‘European governments’. 
 
36 Summerhill, ‘Market intervention’, p. 564. 
37 Bulmer-Thomas, The economic History, p. 110. See also Centeno, ‘Blood and debt’; Coatsworth and 
Williamson, ‘Always protectionist?’; and Rubio Varas, ‘Protectionist but globalised?’. An extreme case 
of concentration was Chile, were customs accounted for more than 90% of public revenues in 1913. By 
contrast, Paraguay represented an exception to the dependence on foreign trade taxes, due to its limited 
participation in world trade. 
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As a consequence, export crises had deep negative consequences on railway investment, 
not just because they threatened the profitability of rail transport but also because they 
endangered the ability of governments to continue supporting railway construction.  
For instance, in Ecuador, the Guayaquil-Quito railway (the main line of the system) 
could only be built after 1895, thanks not only to General Eloy Alfaro’s political will 
but, specially, to rising custom revenues from cocoa exports.38 In Peru, the slowdown of 
railway construction since the 1880s coincided with the loss of some guano deposits to 
Chile in the War of the Pacific, and from the exhaustion of those that remained in 
Peruvian territory. Similarly, the expansion of the Peruvian railway system was only 
resumed in the two decades before 1914 thanks to the recovery of exports.39 In Mexico, 
the dismal export performance of the country before the Porfiriato is, together with the 
extreme regionalization of the structure of the Mexican state, one of the main reasons 
for the country’s delay in railway construction.40 The same close association between 
exports, custom revenues and railway construction has been identified for other 
countries.41
As mentioned previously, while railway expansion depended on government 
revenues and these, in turn, on foreign trade growth, the latter was also, to a large 
extent, a consequence of railway development. This mutual causation between, on the 
one hand, foreign trade and government revenues and, on the other, railways, had the 
potential to generate multiple equilibria. The objective of the next sections is to test the 
existence of such multiple equilibria by analysing the bidirectional causality between 
government revenues and railway development over the period. 
 
 
II 
In order to test the two-way relationship between railways and government resources in 
Latin America before 1914, we specify two equations in which railway development 
depends on government revenues and these, in turn, depend on foreign trade, which was 
to a large extent dependent on railway expansion. Given the mutual causation between 
railway development and government revenues that is involved in this specification, we 
                                                          
38 Clark, ‘Railway building’. 
39 Bulmer-Thomas, The economic History; Zegarra, ‘Transport costs and economic growth’. 
40 Riguzzi, ‘Los caminos del atraso’; Bulmer-Thomas, The economic history. 
41 See, for instance, for El Salvador, Burns, ‘The modernization of underdevelopment’. 
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need an identification strategy to analyse the connection among the main variables. The 
equation for government revenue is: 
 
  𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜒𝑡+ 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (1) 
 
where G is government revenue, T is the volume of imports (the main source of public 
resources in the region at the time) and Z is a vector of covariates. We instrument for 
trade by using both railways and, as is customary in trade studies, the standard gravity 
controls, i.e. the product of the population of each country by the population of its main 
trading partners, and the effective distance between them. Railways are an appropriate 
instrument because, as has been indicated, they were a key factor for export (and 
therefore import) expansion.42
In vector Z we include population as control for each economy’s size, and several 
indicators of political instability (number of changes in the executive and the presence 
of interstate wars or other wars) that might have disturbed the collection of government 
revenue in a given year.
 At the same time, they were not a direct source of public 
revenue, since taxes paid by private railway companies were negligible and the direct 
contribution of state-owned lines to total revenues was very small or null. In other 
words, the instrument verifies the exclusion restriction. 
43
The second equation is based on a rational expectations model of partial adjustment 
of investment in Latin American railways. This assumes that there was an ideal size for 
each country’s railway network conditional on the available information on a number of 
relevant variables. More specifically, 
 
 
  𝑅𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡           (2) 
                                                          
42 Although the argument of this paper relates railway construction to export growth, we use imports 
rather than exports in this equation because the majority of tariff revenue was raised on imports. 
Moreover, there is a tight empirical relation between the two sides of the trade account in this period. A 
simple AR model of deviations of the current account from equilibrium has a very small persistence, with 
a half-life of shocks of only 0.9 years. This can easily be reasoned. On the one hand, government 
revenues could only be reliably raised from imports if exports grew enough to avoid large current account 
deficits; otherwise foreign investors would have seen the potential risks and leave the country (and the 
railway sector, in particular), affecting its import capacity. On the other, in the absence of autonomous 
monetary policies and central banks in the region, it is unlikely that export booms did not encourage 
import growth over a relatively short period, since these countries’ ability to sustain large current account 
surpluses and accumulate reserves was limited. 
43 Other wars include civil wars as well as colonial conflicts in Cuba or Puerto Rico during the period of 
Spanish rule. We also included an indicator for border changes to control for exogenous variations in 
countries’ scale, which takes the value of one for Chile, Bolivia and Peru in 1883 (Pacific war) and for 
Colombia in 1904, to account for the loss of Panama. 
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where R* is a latent variable representing the desired length of railways, G is 
government revenue and X a vector of covariates. Moreover, we model a partial 
adjustment mechanism, whereby investors (public or private) caught up each year with 
the desired network size. In other words, the growth rate of the railway network would 
be a fraction of the gap between its ideal level and the size of the inherited network: 
 Rit − Ri,t−1 = δ�Ri,t−1∗ − Ri,t−1�            (3) 
 
Replacing (3) in (2), we obtain the equation to estimate: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛿𝑎 − 𝛿𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑏𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑐𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑛𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑒𝑖𝑡−1    (4) 
 
Since we are interested in the long-run coefficients of equation (2) (i.e. the relationships 
between the covariates and the desired network density level), we recover them as b = 
(δb)/ δ, and c = (δc)/ δ.  
To account for its potential endogeneity, we instrument for government revenue in 
this equation with two variables: each country’s total level of diplomatic representation 
abroad, as compiled by Bayer, and an index of legislative effectiveness of each 
government, taken from Banks’ database.44 For the exclusion restriction to hold, these 
variables must be good predictors of government revenue but not of railroad mileage 
growth, at least directly. ‘Legislative effectiveness’ was coded by Banks as an index of 
parliaments’ autonomy and power, particularly of their ‘authority with regard to 
taxation and disbursement’.45
                                                          
44 Bayer, ‘Diplomatic exchange data set’; Banks, ‘Cross-national’. 
 The reason to use this instrument is that more effective 
legislatures would be better at raising government revenue inasmuch as they created the 
vehicle for a more consensual fiscal deal in society than, say, a confiscatory 
dictatorship. Arguably, more effective legislatures could also promote railway 
expansion faster than a dictatorship, but the evidence in Latin America offers some clear 
45 In Banks’ database, ‘Legislative effectiveness’ is coded zero if no legislature exists, ‘1’ if legislative 
activity is of a ‘rubber stamp’ character, domestic turmoil makes its implementation impossible or the 
executive impedes the exercise of its function, ‘2’ if the executive’s power substantially outweighs, but 
does not completely dominate, that of the legislature, and ‘3’ for an effective legislature distinguished by 
significant autonomy, including substantial authority with regard to taxation and disbursement and the 
power to override vetoes by the executive. This variable has been used, for instance, to estimate indices of 
state expansion (Schofer and Longhofer, ‘The structural sources’), and as a measure of institutional 
development (Campos and Nugent, ‘Who is afraid’). 
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counter-examples, such as the railway boom after Porfirio Díaz’s takeover in Mexico, or 
the railway expansion in Venezuela under General Antonio Guzmán Blanco (1870-88). 
In other words, railway investors and promoters could sometimes be agnostic about the 
nature of local political institutions, provided they were stable and predictable.  
In the case of diplomatic representation, we posit that countries could only afford 
more (or more expensive) diplomatic representations if they had a higher and more 
stable level of revenues. This explains the correlation between both variables, which is 
enough to meet the exclusion restriction. On the other hand, the evolution of diplomatic 
representation would only very indirectly affect the rhythm of railway construction. To 
be sure, foreign representations could be opened abroad in order to publicize investment 
opportunities in the country, and so might be correlated with the error term of equation 
(4). However, by 1865 all Latin American countries in the sample already had some 
form of diplomatic representation in the UK, France, Germany or the US, which were 
the almost exclusive sources of foreign investment in railroad construction in Latin 
America.46 Likewise, diplomatic representations might be opened up abroad to promote 
trade with foreign countries and, since a large share of Latin American railway traffic 
was linked to foreign trade, the diplomatic instrument might then have a direct influence 
on the left-hand side variable. To take heed of this problem, we include in the vector of 
controls X two standard gravity variables (the product of the population of each country 
and its main trading partners, and the effective distance among them), under the 
assumption that cheaper access to the core markets would have increased the latent 
demand for transportation in Latin America. But since these are exogenous gravity 
variables, we do not expect them to correlate with the total size of the diplomatic 
corps.47
Regarding the other covariates in X, we consider a number of economic, political and 
financial variables that might have influenced railway development in each country. 
Among the economic variables, we include the evolution of the terms of trade, 
constructed by using international prices of the main articles of export of each country. 
As for the potential influence of political and institutional variables, we include again 
several indicators of political instability (number of changes in the executive, interstate 
 
                                                          
46 Cuba and Puerto Rico were, of course, exceptions, but this was compensated by their belonging to the 
Spanish colonial empire up to 1898, and by the American protectorate thereafter, which provided a 
favourable access to the American financial markets. 
47 So, if the diplomatic service was also driven by the same gravity forces, the instrument would be 
exogenous. 
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and other wars), which might have been a deterrent to railway investment, both directly 
(i.e. through the lower friendliness of the business environment) and indirectly, because 
of the difficulty to reach consensus on taxes and therefore to increase government 
capacity to subsidize railway construction.48
We also take into account the potential for financial rationing in the international 
capital markets, particularly as a consequence of sovereign defaults. According to both 
historical and contemporary evidence, the corporate sector suffers a big penalty from 
sovereign defaults in rationed access to external finance.
 
49 In addition, some defaults 
might have been related to the use of public money to subsidize unprofitable railways or 
unscrupulous foreign railway promoters, which would be a deterrent for additional 
investment. Having tried several proxies of access to foreign capital, such as sovereign 
spreads, we decided to use a simple measure of market memory of defaults, dependent 
on the number of years elapsed since the last default.50 We did so for two reasons: one, 
because this memory variable is a good predictor of spreads and, two, because we can 
compute it for the whole sample, whereas the availability of market yields for the debts 
of Latin American countries was more limited.51
The summary statistics for the variables included in the two equations, as well as the 
instruments, for the estimated samples are listed in Table 2. Their sources are detailed in 
the data Appendix at the end of the paper.
 As additional financial variable, we 
also include each country’s exchange rate regime, since Latin American countries on 
silver or with paper currencies had to face persistent depreciation against the gold 
standard countries for most of the period. Since they imported the bulk of their railway 
inputs (rails and rolling stock) from gold countries this depreciation increased 
construction and running costs in domestic currency. Finally, we also include an index 
of global liquidity (the yield on British consols), as an approximation to variations in the 
international financial climate. 
52
 
 
                                                          
48 We also include the same border changes marker of equation (1). 
49 Bergquist, Coffee and conflict; Arteta and Hale, ‘Sovereign debt crises’; Esteves and Jalles, ‘Like 
fathers like sons?’. 
50 Actually, we use a non linear transformation of this variable because some countries never defaulted. 
Therefore, we computed the variable y = x/(x+1), where x is the number of years since the last default, 
and which increases with distance from last default and converges to 1 for countries that never defaulted. 
51 Moreover, for the sub-sample for which spreads are available the tenor of the results does not change 
when we substitute spreads for the non linear memory variable. 
52 We used the test of unit roots in panels proposed by Choi, ‘Unit root tests’, and could not reject the 
stationarity of all variables (including the instruments). 
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Table 2 here 
 
 
III 
Table 3 shows the 2SLS estimates of equation (1), including the first-stage results. All 
the variables (bar the dummies) are converted to logs and to allay any further concerns 
about endogeneity we lagged all right-hand side variables by a year.53
 
 As has been 
indicated, other than railway mileage, we included in the instruments list two gravity 
variables – mass (product of populations of each country and its trading partners in 
Europe and the US) and effective distance. Preliminary inspection suggested that the 
relation between trade and railways might be quadratic, so in order to improve power, 
we also included a quadratic term of railway length. 
Table 3 here 
 
Generally speaking, all significant variables have the expected signs, with a few 
exceptions. The instruments pass the tests of under-identification (Kleinberg-Paap and 
Anderson canonical correlation) and weakness (Cragg-Donald and Stock-Wright). 
However, apart from the last specification, there are problems with the test of 
overidentification (Sargan and Hansen J).54
                                                          
53 In particular, we lag railways as instruments for trade in order to take account of possible serial 
correlation in the error terms of the two equations, which might violate the exogeneity condition in 
equation (1). We tried several lags and the results did not change materially. 
 There is some variation in the size of the 
coefficients of our variable of interest (the share of the variation of imports explained by 
railways and the gravity variables) when we introduce country fixed effects in the last 
two columns. It is probably safe to say that the elasticity of government revenues with 
respect to trade hovered between 0.3 and 0.4. In the last column the population variable 
is highly significant, confirming the expected size effect on government revenues. Since 
the estimated elasticity is greater than one that would imply increasing returns to scale, 
which is a plausible case. However, the coefficient estimates for this variable are not 
stable across models and it is therefore unclear how much weight we should give to this 
54 The Hausman-Wu type tests also reject the consistency of the OLS estimates (see the ‘Exogeneity p-
value), though the evidence is less strong in the last two models. Nevertheless, we conservatively retain 
the IV estimates. 
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result.55 Finally, the political marker is only significant in the regressions without 
country fixed effects, suggesting that Latin American countries systematically differed 
in their levels of political stability across the whole period, as this variable has no 
explanatory power of the within variation of government revenues.56
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (4) also by 2SLS. The instruments 
pass all tests and in all specifications. The coefficient of lagged railway mileage, which 
stands for the (symmetric of the) velocity of adjustment of railway construction, is 
always significant, negative and lower than 1. This is consistent with the partial 
adjustment model presented in equation (3) and implies an adjustment speed of up to 10 
per cent per year. The size of our coefficient of interest is not entirely stable but, apart 
from column (6), hovers close to but below 0.2. Bearing in mind that the structural 
parameter is estimated as the ratio between the coefficient of government revenues and 
the velocity of adjustment, the implied long-term elasticity of railways to revenue is 
always above one and possibly as high as three. 
  
 
Table 4 here 
 
Although often correctly signed, the coefficients of the controls are mostly remarkable 
for their lack of statistical significance, except when country and year fixed effects are 
included. In the later specification, distance to the UK has the expected negative sign, 
arguably working through trade, but the signs of the mass variable and of the distance to 
the US are counterintuitive. Further, being at war with other states adversely impacted 
railway construction. The insignificance of the ‘off gold’ variable may suggest that 
higher construction costs over the short run did not dissuade investors from committing 
funds to the development of railways in countries with sound economic and financial 
prospects. 
Institutional variables are also rarely significant, but have the expected sign when 
they are. It is possible that political differences across Latin American nations were 
sufficiently stable throughout the sample such that they have no explanatory power of 
the within variation, but are significant in explaining it between countries. Finally 
higher world interest rates do not seem to have dampened the rhythm of railway 
                                                          
55 The negative and significant coefficient of the population variable in model (2) is puzzling. But it 
disappears with FE (country or year), meaning that it might be actually capturing the effect of less 
populated countries (e.g. Southern Cone) having more government revenues per capita. 
56 On the other hand, the positive effect of wars in models 3 and 5 might reflect the efforts of 
governments to raise revenues during wars. 
18 
 
construction in Latin America, possibly because the recessionary effects of world 
financial crises are already captured by government revenues.57
In conclusion, the evidence in Tables 3 and 4 supports the hypothesis under test, i.e. 
that government intervention was crucial in the construction of Latin American railways 
and that these were, in turn, a key element in both the integration of these nations in the 
flows of world trade and their subsequent fiscal development prior to 1913. Given that 
we estimated a double feedback system it is interesting to study its dynamic stability. 
With linear functional forms, the stability condition resumes to a comparison of the 
slopes of the two functions: government revenues as a function of railways and railways 
as a function of government revenues. Stability requires that the first slope be smaller 
than the second, which is the case in the regressions with country and country/year fixed 
effects. This is represented in Figure 2, where the two lines were drawn by using the 
estimated coefficients and the sample averages of all the right-hand side variables. An 
exogenous shock to revenues or to railways in a particular country would therefore 
build up and converge to permanently higher levels of railway density and government 
revenues. 
 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
IV 
There are several alternatives to pursue in testing the robustness of the previous results. 
The first has to do with the specification of the railway investment model that underlies 
equation (4). This rational expectations model assumes that investment decisions 
adjusted seamlessly to the acquisition of new information for railway prospects. 
However, as is well known on the theoretical and empirical literature on investment 
functions, simple accelerator models similar to equation (4) often fail empirically 
because of not accounting for the option value of waiting.58
                                                          
57 The consol variable drops out from model (7) because of collinearity with the year fixed effects. 
 In the face of uncertainty, 
rational investors have an option to wait for more confirming information before 
investing, what generates excessive inertia of investment to new information in 
equations such as (4). To try and account for this we ran the same model with longer 
lags.  
58 Dixit, ‘Investment and hysteresis’; Pindyck, ‘Irreversibility’. 
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The second category of robustness considerations relates to the estimation method. 
Here we consider three different alternatives. First, even though we are estimating a 
double-feedback relation between railways and government revenues we chose to 
estimate the two equations separately by 2SLS. This guarantees consistent estimates of 
the structural parameters, but we can try and improve efficiency by using system 
methods and jointly estimating the two equations through 3SLS. Secondly, as an 
alternative treatment of endogeneity, we applied dynamic panels (Arellano-Bond) 
methods. The main advantage of this technique is to provide a large number of 
instruments consistent with the rational expectations component of our partial 
adjustment model of railway construction, which might address the problem of our 
instruments for government expenditures not being strong enough. And, finally, as a 
third variation on the issue of estimation methodology, we ran cointegrated panel 
models, which were specifically developed to deal with the possibility of non-
stationarity in large N and large T dynamic panels.59
The results of these robustness checks are compared in Table 5, that focuses 
specifically on the elasticity of government revenues in the railway equation (i.e. b = δb/ 
δ).
 
60 The first three columns compare the elasticities considering different lags. When 
we increase the number of lags we indeed obtain better fits and, although the size of the 
elasticity of railways to government revenues falls by 10 per cent relative to Table 4, the 
difference is not statistically significant.61
 
 However, in the end, as the length of the 
waiting period for railway investments in Latin America is not observable, we prefer 
reporting the results with one year lags of Table 4. 
Table 5 here 
 
The next three columns of the table list the same elasticity under alternative estimation 
techniques. In the case of the 3SLS and Arellano-Bond methods, the elasticity loses its 
significance and the overall quality of the adjustment is actually worse than in the single 
equation models.62
                                                          
59 Pesaran and Smith, ‘Estimating long-run relationships’; Pesaran, Shin and Smith, ‘Estimating long-run 
relationships’ and ‘Pool mean group estimation’. 
 Since 3SLS estimation requires more stringent assumptions to yield 
consistent estimators than 2SLS, and the properties of the Arellano-Bond method 
60 Full results are available from the authors on request. 
61 On the other hand, with lags up to three years more control variables become significant. 
62 The 3SLS model actually had a negative R2 and the Arellano-Bond regressions fail to pass the over-
identification test. 
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depend on having large cross-sections relative to the time dimension, which is not the 
case of our sample, all in all we prefer our original 2SLS results.63
In the case of the dynamic panel estimation, we preliminarily tested for panel 
cointegration using the four tests proposed by Westerlund.
 
64
Our final robustness check also deals with the stability of the results through time, as 
it is possible that the results are weaker in the whole sample than in sub-periods. The 
50-odd years covered by the regressions witnessed substantial transformations in terms 
of trade patterns and specialisation, state capacity and financial market integration, 
which could change the strength of the empirical relation under study. Focusing again 
on the railway equation (4), Figure 3 shows the coefficients of government revenues 
that result from dropping from the estimation the last years of the sample, starting from 
1880 onwards.  
 Even though we could not 
reject the absence of cointegration between our variables, we are aware of the low 
power of these tests with relatively short time dimensions for each individual cross 
section unit. Consequently, we still estimated our model as a cointegrated panel. In 
choosing the lag lengths we had to trade off quality of fit and degrees of freedom. As a 
compromise, we set a maximum lag of two years and used the individual lags that 
minimized the usual information criteria for model selection (AIC and BIC). In the last 
column of Table 5 we report the coefficient of government revenues in the pooled mean 
group specification (PMG), in which we allow the short-run coefficients to vary 
between countries, whereas imposing the same long-run coefficients. The elasticity 
estimate is significant, although lower than in Table 4, whilst the tenor of the results for 
the rest of the model is unchanged. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
This figure reveals an interesting pattern, although it has the problem that the estimates 
for the smaller samples are very imprecise, due to the drop of the majority of the 
observations.65
                                                          
63 Wooldridge, Econometric analysis. 
 In any case, Figure 3 implies that there was a clear breakpoint between 
1890 and 1893. In between these two years the coefficient of government revenues 
increases in size and becomes statistically significant. Arguably, this is an expression of 
64 Westerlund, ‘Testing for error correction’. 
65 For instance, by dropping all years from 1880 on we only retain 96 observations of the original sample 
of 480. 
21 
 
the fallout from the Baring crisis, which reduced the ability of Latin American countries 
to borrow from abroad. Under more stringent credit constraints, the collateral of 
government revenues became binding for railway construction. By contrast, during 
periods of credit expansion and railway investment booms, it was easy for governments 
to borrow, even without revenues that would justify it. In fact, the size of the coefficient 
was lower just before 1890 and had been falling throughout the 1880s. Similarly, after 
rising to a maximum of 0.55 in 1890, the elasticity of railway construction to 
government revenues fell systematically until 1910 (except for a hiccup in 1907, no 
doubt associated with the US stock market crisis) before rising again until the eve of the 
First World War. By the early teens the coefficient had fallen to close to 0.13. Despite 
this decrease, the coefficient remains significant after 1893, as shown in the second 
panel of Figure 3. Hence, our results, although influenced by the cyclical nature of 
world investment booms and busts, are not entirely driven by them. 
 
V 
Our estimation results indicate the presence of a double feedback relation between 
railway construction and government capacity in pre-war Latin America intermediated 
through foreign trade. Such relation is consistent with a multiple equilibria model and 
with the possibility for some Latin American countries to become stuck in a non-
development trap, in which foreign trade and government revenues did not grow enough 
due to insufficient railway development, and simultaneously railway development was 
stunted because of the low level of external trade and the consequent scarcity of state 
resources. 
The requirement of government resources for the economies to reap the benefits of 
the railway technology would be consistent with both a ‘big push’ interpretation, in 
which the government would be functional in solving coordination failures, and a ‘big 
grab’ history, in which state revenues were necessary to grease the wheels of politics 
and negotiate with railway promoters and those local elites that could potentially block 
the projects. Under either of these assumptions, these results contribute to our 
understanding of the growing differences that opened up across Latin American 
economies during the first globalisation period. For instance, the prolonged stagnation 
of railway construction in Colombia, which originated in the difficulties that this 
country faced to increase exports and government revenues, contrasts with the sustained 
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expansion of the rail systems of Argentina, Uruguay, or Mexico since 1879, closely 
associated with their growing involvement in world trade. 
Our results also highlight the importance of short-term shocks in the long-term 
evolution of each economy. The impact of wars, sudden changes in the terms of trade or 
institutional changes affecting the ability of the government to collect resources also had 
a bearing on the future expansion of the railway system and the economy. In order to 
quantify the economic significance of these effects, Table 6 presents four counterfactual 
exercises whereby we investigate the required increase in government revenues for a 
given country to attain the same railway density (measured in km per km2) as another 
country with a more developed network by 1913. For instance, in the first row we 
consider the possibility of Colombia reaching the same railway density as Argentina in 
1913 (11.5 km per 1,000 km2, rather than the actual 0.94). The push variable in these 
counterfactuals is the size of government revenues, which we introduced in a dynamic 
simulation of the size of the network by using the system of equations (1) and (4), while 
assuming that all other variables were kept at their historical levels. We consider two 
alternative scenarios: one where we add a permanent percentage increase to government 
revenues each year between 1865 and 1913; and the other where we shock revenues 
only once at the beginning of the period. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
The table shows that the required amounts to move each country to a different long-run 
path vary from modest to moderate. Focusing on the first line, the cumulated impact of 
a permanent 3 per cent annual increase in revenue since 1865 would have been required 
to bridge the gap between the densities of the Colombian and Argentinean networks. 
Alternatively, an initial injection of slightly less than 108 per cent of the Colombian 
revenue in 1865, representing just over £1.5 million, would have also achieved the same 
result. Very similar numbers would have been required for Colombia to match the 
slightly denser Uruguayan network. The last two cases in Table 6 involve countries of 
relatively similar size but ultimately different railway development. The figures for a 
Honduran convergence to the Costa Rican density in 1913 are much smaller than the 
Colombian ones, whereas the Peru-to-Mexico scenario would have demanded values in 
between these two cases. 
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We report this exercise mostly for illustration and as a way of gauging the economic 
significance of the impact of government support to railway development in Latin 
America. Interpreted literally, these figures suggest that a modest capital injection 
would be sufficient to achieve higher levels of network density. However, the 
counterfactual estimates are conditional on the cœteris paribus assumption and we can 
imagine many reasons why a permanent increase in government revenue might be hard 
to sustain over 50 years. But any mitigating reasons do not ultimately detract from the 
importance of the public-private partnership link we establish in our analysis. 
Finally, our estimates also allow identifying those cases in which countries received 
a (positive or negative) shock that altered the long term trend derived from their 
fundamentals. Figure 4 shows the rail mileage predicted by the model over time, 
according to the level of the underlying variables and the dynamics of the model, and 
compares it with the evolution of the actual railway length of each Latin American 
economy.66
 
 Peru or Colombia are two clear cases in which an easily identifiable 
negative shock moved downward the predicted growth trend of the railway system, 
without any clear change in the ‘ultimate’ growth determinants of those countries. 
Figure 4 here 
 
The figure also shows the main deviations of the actual railway networks from their 
predicted level. Whereas in most countries both follow very similar trends, there are 
some interesting outliers. The most remarkable cases are, for different reasons, Chile 
and Colombia. Chile before the War of the Pacific (1879-83) is the main case of railway 
“overbuilding” in the region. Although our estimates predict the stagnation of the 
Chilean network at least until the end of the war,67
                                                          
66 Notice that all the predicted series coincide with the actual railway mileage in 1913, because the 
dependent variable in equation (4) is the growth in railway mileage and the sum of error terms is zero in 
least squares estimators. 
 in fact the country expanded its 
network at good pace even before the war and the saltpetre export boom. To a large 
extent, this might partly be explained by the pioneering involvement of the Chilean 
government in the expansion of the railway network since the early 1850s. The opposite 
case is represented by Colombia (and also Ecuador or Honduras), where railway 
construction was much slower than predicted. In these countries, whereas the relatively 
67 Nothing prevents the predicted railway mileage from decreasing. However, since the closing down of 
lines was very rare during the period, we consider that a decrease in the predicted mileage would be 
consistent with stagnation in the actual length. 
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low level of exports and government revenues did not allow for massive railway 
construction, the large divergence between the predicted and the actual mileage indicate 
that there were other additional obstacles to the expansion of the rail network. The 
Colombian case is the most striking, and the inability of this country to expand its 
railway system might have been associated to its particular difficulties to reach stable 
national consensus in the field of railway policy.  
 
VI 
This paper has analysed the interplay between government revenues, railway expansion 
and trade development in Latin America during the period of the first globalisation. Our 
results show that increasing government revenues triggered railway infrastructure 
development, which was instrumental in opening up the economies of Latin America to 
world oceanic trade. In turn, trade growth increased government revenues, which made 
the guarantees and subsidies to railways companies credible. We also found that the 
relationship between government revenues and railway expansion weakened during 
periods of easy international credit. A direct implication of our results is that, during the 
period under consideration, some countries might have been trapped in a low-level 
equilibrium, in which railways were not built because of insufficient government 
revenues, but these did not grow enough due to insufficient transport infrastructure and 
its negative effects on foreign trade. In that context, an exogenous positive shock to 
government revenues might have brought the economy from that low-level to a high-
level equilibrium.  
Several explanations can account for the need of government resources to develop 
railway infrastructure, and we leave to future research the task to assess their relative 
importance. The main implication of our analysis is that the build-up of state capacity 
was a necessary condition for the extension of railways. Since the railways were clearly 
instrumental in export development and economic growth, our results may contribute to 
a better understanding of the growing divergence between the economies of the region 
during this period. 
 
APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 
Railway data 
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Yearly railway mileage has been taken from Mitchell, International historical statistics, 
and Sanz Fernández, Historia de los ferrocarriles, except in the following cases: 
Argentina (from Dirección de Ferrocarriles Nacionales, Estadística de los Ferrocarriles 
en Explotación, 1892-1913); Brazil (from www.ibge.gov.br); Chile (before 1870, own 
estimation from Marín Vicuña, Estudios, and Alliende Edwards, Historia del 
ferrocarril; from 1870 onwards, Braun et al., ‘Economía chilena’; Cuba (from Zanetti 
Lecuona and García Álvarez, Caminos para el azúcar; México (from INEGI, 
Estadísticas Históricas); and Uruguay (own estimation from the country’s statistical 
yearbooks). 
 
Population  
Population figures for Latin American countries have been taken from Yáñez, Rivero, 
Badia-Miró and Carreras-Marín, ‘La población’; except for Puerto Rico, from Mitchell, 
International historical statistics, and Bolivia (own elaboration on the basis of Dalence, 
Bosquejo estadístico, and the country Population Censuses). Population of the main 
trade partners (UK and US) has been taken from Maddison, The world economy. 
 
Effective distance to the core markets 
We estimated effective distance following the procedure suggested by Clemens and 
Williamson, ‘Wealth bias’, i.e. we coded this variable as the product of a measure of 
geographic distance and an index of cost of shipping between each country and its main 
trade partners (UK and US). For most countries, geographical distance has been taken 
as the pre-Panama canal distance between the main port of each country and London or 
New York (or San Francisco in the case of the countries with the main port in the 
Pacific), as listed in Philip, Philip’s mercantile maritime atlas, and National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency, Distances between ports. For the majority of nations we have 
used the index of tramp shipping freight charges from Isserlis, ‘Tramp shipping 
cargoes’, p. 122, with base year 1869 = 100. 
 
Imports, government revenues and exchange rates 
Import data were kindly provided by Béatrice Dedinger. Some gaps in her data have 
been filled in with information taken from Mitchell, International historical statistics, 
the Correlates of War database, Schoonover, ‘Central American commerce’ and Puerto 
Rico official trade statistics. Total government revenue, in local currency units were 
obtained from Accominotti et al., ‘The spread of empire’, for the period 1880-1913. For 
the earlier period or countries not covered in this database, information was gathered 
from the following sources: Argentina from Cortés Conde, Dinero, deuda y crisis; 
Brazil from Motta et al., Estatísticas históricas, and several issues of the Brazilian 
budget laws; Chile from Wagner et al., ‘Economía chilena’, and Oficina Central de 
Estadística, Sinópsis; Colombia from Mitchell, International historical statistics, and 
Kalmanovitz, Nueva historia económica; Cuba from the official public budgets (various 
years), Mexico from El Colegio de Mexico, Estadísticas económicas; Wilkie, The 
Mexican revolution, and Mitchell, International historical statistics; Peru from 
Mitchell, International historical statistics and Tantaleán Arbulú, Política economic-
financiera; and Uruguay from Millot and Bertino, Historia económica (vol. II and III), 
and the Uruguayan Statistical Yearbooks. The majority of the exchange rate (local 
currency units per pound sterling) data comes from the compilation by Schneider et al., 
Währungen, or Accominotti et al., ‘The spread of empire’ with the following 
exceptions: Argentina from Cortés Conde, Dinero, deuda y crisis; Brazil from Motta et 
al., Estatísticas históricas; Colombia from Ocampo, Colombia, and the MOxLAD 
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database at http://oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk/; Costa Rica from Soley Güell, Historia 
económica; Cuba from the MOxLAD database; Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
from Young, Central American currency; Peru from Ministerio de Fomento, Extracto 
estadítico. 
 
Terms of trade 
For those countries included in the database by Christopher Blattman et al., ‘Winners 
and losers’, and given that the UK was by far the main trading partner of Latin 
American countries throughout the period under analysis, we have used the ratio 
between a trade-weighted index of commodity export prices and an index of UK export 
prices, as compiled by Blattman et al., ‘Winners and losers’. For other countries, we 
have computed the ratio between the price of the main export and an index of UK 
export prices. Each country’s main exports are taken from Mitchell, International 
historical statistics, and the evolution of its price comes also from Blattman et al., 
‘Winners and losers’.  
 
Defaults, spreads and exchange rate regimes 
Default histories were coded from Esteves, ‘Quis custodiet quem?’, and Suter, 
Schuldenzyklen; the yields on British consols come from Accominotti et al., ‘The spread 
of empire’, and Homer and Sylla, A history of interest rates; spreads over British 
consols use mostly four sources: Accominotti et al., ‘The spread of empire’, Ferguson 
and Schularick, ‘The empire effect’; Esteves, ‘Quis custodiet quem?’; and Clemens and 
Williamson, ‘Wealth bias’; exchange rate regimes (gold and silver/bimetallic standards) 
were coded from a number of sources: Accominotti et al., ‘The spread of empire’, Bae 
and Bailey, ‘The Latin Monetary Union’; Esteves, ‘Between imperialism and 
capitalism’; Ferguson and Schularick, ‘The empire effect’; Leavens, Silver money; 
Meissner, ‘A new world order’; Sédillot, All moneys; and Young, Central American 
currency. 
 
Wars, changes in the executive, legislative effectiveness and diplomatic representation 
The numbers of international and other wars that affected each country were compiled 
from the Correlates of War database. The number of changes in the executive and the 
index of “legislative effectiveness” were taken from Banks, ‘Cross-national’. Finally, 
the aggregate level of diplomatic representation was worked out from Bayer, 
Diplomatic exchange data set, that lists five levels of bilateral representation. We added 
up these indices for all the representations abroad of each Latin American country and 
used the sum as an instrument for government revenues. 
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Figure 1. Railway p.c. and exports p.c. in Latin American economies in 1910
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Figure 2. Estimated linear relation between government revenues and railways 
 
Note: the Figure represents the model with country fixed effects. Whereas the slope b = 3.2 is obtained 
directly from Table 4, for β we multiplied the estimate of the elasticity of government revenues to trade 
from Table 3 (0.337) by the estimated coefficient of railways in the first stage. The system is stable 
because this estimate for β = 0.04 is smaller than b. Likewise, in the model with country and year fixed 
effects, b = 2.0 and β = 0.1. 
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Figure 3. Coefficients and 90% confidence intervals of Log government revenues 
 
Note: for each observation, the year indicates the end of the sample. 
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Figure 4. Actual vs. predicted mileage of the Latin American railway networks (in logs) 
Table 1. Railway mileage in Latin America in 1913 
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 Total length 
(km) 
 Km per 10,000 
km2 
 Km per 
1,000 pop. 
Argentina 32,494 Puerto Rico 672.23 Argentina 4.27 
Brazil 24,614 Cuba 339.94 Chile 2.19 
Mexico 20,447 Uruguay 138.14 Uruguay 2.19 
Chile 8,070 Costa Rica 134.36 Costa Rica 1.77 
Cuba 3,874 Salvador 120.66 Cuba 1.47 
Peru 3,317 Argentina 114.89 Mexico 1.27 
Uruguay 2,576 Chile 109.71 Brazil 0.94 
Bolivia 1,346 Mexico 103.74 Honduras 0.84 
Colombia 965 Guatemala 85.13 Peru 0.83 
Venezuela 890 Haiti 63.18 Bolivia 0.67 
Guatemala 926 Dominican R. 51.21 Paraguay 0.61 
Costa Rica 696 Honduras 47.77 Panama 0.57 
Puerto Rico 612 Brazil 28.92 Puerto Rico 0.52 
Ecuador 606 Panama 28.89 Guatemala 0.46 
Honduras 532 Paraguay 26.96 Nicaragua 0.42 
Paraguay 433 Peru 23.37 Venezuela 0.36 
Nicaragua 294 Nicaragua 22.70 Ecuador 0.33 
Dominican R. 252 Ecuador 21.27 Dominican R. 0.32 
El Salvador 250 Bolivia 10.41 Salvador 0.22 
Panama 217 Venezuela 9.76 Colombia 0.17 
Haiti 180 Colombia 9.41 Haiti 0.10 
Total 103,591 Weighted avg. 51.76 Weighted avg. 1.26 
Source: See the Appendix. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of variables included in the model 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Imports 513 -0.540 2.530 -13.564 5.412 
Railways mileage 513 6.858 1.648 2.773 10.357 
Pop×Pop trading partners 513 39.012 2.179 33.811 44.219 
Effect. distance to UK 513 1.411 0.396 0.556 2.462 
Effect. distance to US 513 0.728 0.626 -0.617 1.927 
Population 513 7.792 1.100 5.321 10.144 
No. of exec. changes 513 0.347 0.597 0.000 3.000 
Interstate wars 513 0.055 0.227 0.000 1.000 
Other Wars 513 0.066 0.249 0.000 1.000 
Gov't Revenues 479 0.797 1.292 -4.023 3.724 
Ambassadors 479 3.263 0.658 0.693 4.454 
Legis. Effectiveness 479 1.762 0.777 0.000 3.000 
Terms of Trade 479 4.736 0.235 4.223 5.406 
Years since last default 479 0.655 0.402 0.000 1.000 
British consol yields 479 1.043 0.107 0.815 1.227 
Off Gold 479 0.701 0.458 0.000 1.000 
Source: see the Appendix. 
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Table 3. The determinants of government revenues in the Latin American countries (1865-1913) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Second Stage    
Log imports (t-1) 0.516*** 0.564*** 0.513*** 0.337*** 0.292*** 
 (0.013) (0.033) (0.027) (0.082) (0.079) 
Log population (t-1)  -0.165*** -0.070 0.445 1.391*** 
  (0.061) (0.049) (0.282) (0.345) 
No. of exec. Changes (t-1)  -0.215*** -0.243*** 0.065 0.048 
  (0.077) (0.073) (0.040) (0.042) 
Interstate wars (t-1)  0.182 0.521*** 0.007 0.221* 
  (0.129) (0.192) (0.097) (0.124) 
Other wars (t-1)  -0.137 -0.184 -0.101 -0.075 
  (0.157) (0.149) (0.083) (0.086) 
Year FE No No Yes No Yes  
Country FE No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 513 513 513 513 513 
  First Stage    
Mass 0.470*** -1.940***  0.691**  
 (0.036) (0.321)  (0.317)  
Distance to UK 0.038 -0.036 -0.432 0.770 1.095 
 (0.361) (0.323) (0.299) (1.552) (2.751) 
Distance to US 0.211 -0.695** -0.836*** 0.391  
 (0.279) (0.341) (0.318) (1.533)  
Rail length -1.042*** -1.029*** -1.135*** -1.051*** -1.100*** 
 (0.272) (0.256) (0.243) (0.206) (0.187) 
Rail length2 0.119*** 0.143*** 0.159*** 0.086*** 0.107*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) 
F stat (1st stage) 358.3 73.36 108.24 11.03 18.25 
Exogeneity p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.127 0.138 
Over-id p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.483 
Under-id p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Stock-Wright p-value 0.000   0.000 0.002 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Omitted coefficients: constant, border changes and fixed effects. 
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Table 4. The determinants of railway development in the Latin American countries (1865-1913) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   Second stage    
Log gov’t revenues (t-1) 0.112*** 0.109* 0.131** 0.090 0.143** 0.305** 0.181*** 
 (0.033) (0.057) (0.055) (0.059) (0.062) (0.119) (0.064) 
Log railway mileage (t-1) -0.080*** -0.068*** -0.091*** -0.059** -0.083*** -0.095*** -0.092*** 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.032) (0.025) (0.030) (0.025) (0.023) 
Log terms of trade (t-1) 0.033 0.050 -0.006 0.050 0.018 -0.149 -0.038 
 (0.044) (0.053) (0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.121) (0.077) 
Log pop×pop trad partners (t-1)  -0.011  -0.009 -0.017 -0.091* -0.233*** 
  (0.011)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.051) (0.083) 
Log effect distance to UK (t-1)  0.007  0.004 0.017 -0.087 -1.104** 
  (0.022)  (0.021) (0.026) (0.399) (0.509) 
Log effect distance to US (t-1)  -0.023  -0.010 -0.012 -0.078 1.205** 
  (0.028)  (0.026) (0.018) (0.396) (0.542) 
No. of exec. changes (t-1)   0.002 -0.001 0.008 -0.019 -0.004 
   (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) 
Interstate wars (t-1)   -0.051 -0.030 -0.060* -0.016 -0.102** 
   (0.041) (0.034) (0.034) (0.049) (0.042) 
Other wars (t-1)   0.013 0.014 0.031 0.062 0.006 
   (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.042) (0.029) 
Years since last default   -0.015 0.000 -0.018 -0.014 -0.014 
   (0.027) (0.023) (0.024) (0.032) (0.026) 
British consol yields   -0.159 -0.035 0.317 -0.226  
   (0.153) (0.125) (1.602) (0.143)  
Off gold   0.026* 0.022 0.058 0.068 0.048 
   (0.016) (0.030) (0.039) (0.050) (0.038) 
Year FE No No No No Yes No Yes  
Country FE No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 479 479 
   First stage    
Diplomatic representation -0.001 -0.106 -0.062 -0.167*** 0.0477 0.231*** 0.341*** 
 (0.082) (0.067) (0.044) (0.062) (0.061) (0.070) (0.068) 
Legislative effectiveness 0.256*** 0.201*** -0.169*** 0.173*** 0.187*** -0.007 0.103* 
 (0.048) (0.058) (0.044) (0.054) (0.052) (0.060) (0.061) 
F stat (1st stage) 15.65 6.500 7.650 7.240 7.390 5.55 13.26 
Exogeneity p-value 0.025 0.124 0.055 0.233 0.025 0.000 0.003 
Over-id p-value 0.502 0.219 0.246 0.093 0.504 0.805 0.307 
Under-id p-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.000 
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.008 0.078 0.007 0.110 0.031 0.001 0.001 
Stock-Wright p-value 0.009 0.089 0.007 
 
0.119 0.040 0.006 0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Omitted coefficients: constant, 
border changes and fixed effects. 
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Table 5. Elasticity estimates for different estimation methods 
 
Partial adjustment 3SLS Arellano Cointegrated panel 
 
1 year 2 years 3 years 
 
Bond (PMG) 
 
ε(R*,G) 1.967*** 1.749*** 1.764*** -1.681 0.052 1.072*** 
 
 
(0.543) (0.428) (0.413) (7.390) (0.134) (0.134) 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses computed from the so-called Delta 
method, when applicable. 
 
Table 6. Counterfactuals for government revenues 
Counterfactual R0,1913 R1,1913 Permanent Once  
   % % £'000 
COL⇒ARG 0.94 11.49 2.96 107.80 1522.1 
COL⇒URY 0.94 13.81 3.10 113.26 1651.2 
PER⇒MEX 2.34 10.37 1.42 51.61 1819.3 
HND⇒CRI 4.78 13.44 1.03 37.52 455.3 
R0,1913 (R1,1913) stands for the actual (counterfactual) railway density in 1913, expressed in km per 
1,000 km2. 
 
